Automated license plate recognition (ALPR) is now used not only for traffic administration but also for intelligence-led policing, suspect tracing, border control, and post-incident reconstruction. In criminal procedure, however, an ALPR read is not a neutral photograph. It is the end product of a technical chain that includes image capture, plate localization, segmentation, optical character recognition, database comparison, and a final human or machine-generated decision. Each step can affect the fairness of later proceedings. This article examines how ALPR-derived information should be received, challenged, and regulated in Mongolia when it enters the criminal process. It argues that Mongolian law already contains a partial foundation for such regulation through constitutional privacy guarantees, the Law on Personal Data Protection, the Law on Criminal Procedure, and the Police Law, but those norms do not yet provide a coherent evidential model for ALPR. The article therefore proposes a dual-threshold approach. At the investigative stage, an ALPR hit should function only as a lead unless a trained officer conducts immediate human verification. At the trial stage, the prosecution should satisfy a five-part TRACE test: trigger legality, reliability, audit trail, contestability, and evidential fit. The contribution of the article is practical as well as doctrinal. It shows how a relatively small legal system can regulate a fast-moving surveillance technology without either romanticizing technical efficiency or blocking legitimate crime control.